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AIRLINE EMPLOYEE SLOWDOWNS AND
SICKOUTS AS UNLAWFUL SELF HELP: A
LEGAL AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
JAMES J. MCDONALD, JR.*
EPHRAIM ASHER**
I. INTRODUCTION
DEREGULATION OF THE airlines caused a radical
upheaval in labor-management relations in that indus-
try. While labor relations in the United States have gener-
ally been in a state of transition over the past two decades,
a combination of decreased government regulation, in-
creased carrier strength through mergers and acquisi-
tions, cutthroat competition, and diminished sentiment
among employees and the general public toward unions
has had a particularly dramatic impact on labor relations
in the airline industry.'
One example of the changing nature of labor relations
in the airline industry is the decreasing use of strikes by
unions as the primary method of exerting economic pres-
sure upon a carrier during collective bargaining. Long a
* Associate, Fisher & Phillips, Atlanta, Georgia. B.A. 1981, New College of the
University of South Florida; J.D. 1984, Georgetown University.
** Consulting Economist, Tallahassee, Florida. B.A. 1965, Hebrew University
(Jerusalem); M.A. 1967, Ph.D. 1969, University of Rochester.
I See generally, CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE DEREGU-
LATION (. McKelvey ed. 1988) (discussing recent changes and emerging develop-
ments in air transport labor relations); McDonald, Airline Management Prerogative in
the Deregulation Era, 52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 869 (1987) (analyzing airline manage-
ment's right to make organizational decisions without union bargaining or con-
sent); Northrup, The New Employee Relations Climate in Airlines, 36 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 167 (1983) (examining the effect of deregulation on employee relations
in the airline industry).
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potent tool in labor's arsenal, both in the airline industry
and industry generally, the economic strike can inflict se-
vere economic damage upon an employer as it grinds the
company's business to a halt. The strike has not been a
particularly effective tool for airline unions in the 1980s,
however. Many airline strikes have brought unions em-
barrassment at best, and in some cases have caused mas-
sive job loss among strikers and even loss of union
representation rights.
A number of explanations may be offered for this phe-
nomenon. The government's firing of 11,000 striking air
traffic controllers in 1981 set a tone of at least implicit
government approval of aggressive management re-
sponse to union strikes.2 A recessionary economy and an
often-plentiful pool of striker replacements, along with
legal incentives for workers to cross picket lines, 3 left
many employees reluctant to honor strikes called by their
unions. The refusal of unions representing other crafts or
classes at a struck carrier to honor the picket lines of their
brother unions enabled carriers to continue operating, al-
beit sometimes at reduced levels, during a strike.
Regardless of the precipitating factors, however, the
success record for unions involved in airline strikes dur-
ing the 1980s is dismal. For example, the International
Association of Machinists (IAM) struck Continental Air-
lines prior to that carrier's bankruptcy in 1983, and the
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and the Union of
Flight Attendants (UFA) struck the carrier immediately
following its bankruptcy filing.4 Continental resumed op-
erations after bankruptcy, however, using striker replace-
2 Rosen, Collective Bargaining: A Union Perspective, in CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: AIR-
LINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE DEREGULATION, supra note 1, at 11, 15.
In Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 109 S. Ct.
1225-26 (1989), the Supreme Court emphasized the right of employees not to
strike and held that a carrier is not required "to lay offjunior crossover employees
in order to reinstate more senior strikers at the conclusion of a strike." Id. at
1226. This holding permits employees to effectively enhance their seniority by
continuing to work during a strike.
4 In re Continental Airlines Corp., 64 Bankr. 822, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
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ments and crossovers at pay rates approximately fifty
percent below pre-strike rates.5 In April 1985, eighteen
months after the strike began, the IAM and UFA surren-
dered and agreed unconditionally to return to work.6
ALPA formally ended its strike six months later pursuant
to an order from the bankruptcy court,7 but by that time
the carrier had withdrawn its recognition of both ALPA
and the IAM due to those unions' loss of majority support
in the crafts or classes they represented. UFA attempted
another strike against Continental in March 1989. The
strike ended after only four days because ninety-seven
percent of the carrier's flight attendants refused to honor
picket lines.8
Similarly, the Independent Federation of Flight Attend-
ants (IFFA) struck Trans World Airlines in 1986. The
union abandoned the strike after seventy-two days when
IFFA leadership told its members to unconditionally re-
turn to work, with no assurance that strikers would be re-
hired.9 TWA continued most of its operations during the
strike by using striker replacements and crossovers, and
nearly 3,800 IFFA members remained unemployed at the
end of the strike.' 0 Likewise, the Transport Workers
Union (TWU) ended a twenty-eight day strike of ground
employees against Pan American World Airways in 1985,
after accepting a contract offer that differed little from
management's last pre-strike offer." The TWU negotia-
tors recommended acceptance of the offer for fear that
further jobs would be lost by TWU members if the strike
Id.
Flight Attendants, Machinists End Strike Against Continental, 278 AvIATION DAILY
281 (Apr. 19, 1985).
NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, FIrY-FIRsT/FiFrY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 63
(1986) [hereinafter NMB ANNUAL REPORT].
. Broad Powers Ordered for Examiner in Eastern Air Lines Bankruptcy Case, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 57, at A-10 (Mar. 27, 1989).
NMB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 61.
Id.
I TWU Votes to End Four Week Strike, Accepts New Pact At Pan American, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at A-10 (Mar. 28, 1985).
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continued.' 2  ALPA's twenty-nine day strike against
United in 1985 was one of the few airline strikes in the
1980s that was not a complete failure, as ALPA succeeded
in its goal of narrowing that carrier's two-tier pay scale.'"
However, the carrier had prepared to replace the strikers
by training a group of 500 new hire pilots then flying for
other carriers to induce them to serve as striker replace-
ments on United.' 4
Finally, the bitter and dramatic 1989 strike by the IAM,
ALPA and TWU against Eastern Airlines proved to be a
failure as well. While the unions succeeded in virtually
shutting down the carrier for a period of time and driving
it into bankruptcy in their principled stand against Frank
Lorenzo, most union members lost their jobs as a result.
The carrier eventually resumed operations on a smaller
scale using striker replacements and crossovers, after di-
vesting itself of the profitable Northeast Shuttle and other
choice assets. The ultimate goal of the strike - wresting
control of the carrier from Lorenzo's Texas Air Corpora-
tion - never was attained, and in the midst of their public
rhetoric proclaiming the strike a success, union leaders
scrambled privately, searching in vain for a means to save
face.
As a result of these experiences, even ALPA's Director
of Representation has admitted that a strike is "no longer
an effective bargaining tool," and that this fact has "pro-
foundly altered the balance of power in the collective bar-
gaining process.' 5 The effectiveness of the strike as a
self-help weapon for airline unions today is therefore
open to serious question.' 6
What, then, has taken the place of the strike in collec-
12 Id.
," NMB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 60.
14 Recent Decision, Air Line Pilots Ass 'n v. United Air Lines, 15 TRANSP. L.J. 435,
438 (1987).
'- Rosen, supra note 2, at 11, 21.
,,5 For instance, there were no strikes against major airlines in 1987 or 1988. See
Teamsters Remain On Job at Pan Am, Carrier Imposes Final Contract Offer, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at A-13 (Feb. 23, 1988). While the Teamsters obtained the
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tive bargaining? The "corporate campaign" is growing in
popularity among airline unions as a self-help tool to re-
place the strike.' 7 This strategy involves orchestrating a
sophisticated appeal to a carrier's stockholders, its lend-
ers, travel agents and the traveling public, emphasizing
the alleged unfairness of the carrier's bargaining position
and sometimes even calling into question the safety of the
carrier's operation.' 8 Corporate campaigns were carried
out on a massive scale against Eastern Air Lines in 1988
and 1989,19 and previously on a smaller scale against
Transamerica Airlines, United Air Lines 20 and other carri-
right to strike Pan American upon the expiration of mediation and the cooling off
period in February 1988, the union has not commenced a strike. Id.
This decline in strikes is not limited to the airline industry. Bureau of Labor
Statistics data reveal that the number of strikes in U.S. industry involving 1,000
workers or more has declined dramatically during the 1980s:










U.S. Work Force Shows Record Low Number of Work Stoppages in 1988, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 36, at B-I (Feb. 24, 1989).
17 See generally, C. PERRY, UNION CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS (1987) (discussing how
a "corporate campaign" works, and evaluating the success and failure of these
campaigns as a union tactic).
18 See id. at iii. For example, in its national publication, ALPA urged its mem-
bers, in relation to the strike against Eastern, to "[e]ducate travel agents."
DiNunno, On the Eastern Front, AIR LINE PILOT, Aug. 1989, at 32, 34. The publica-
tion noted that "[s]ome travel agents have been personally contacted by striking
Eastern pilots about the carrier's efforts to fly without real workers. Many travel
agents are requiring passengers to sign a waiver if they insist on flying Eastern or
Continental." Id.
- See AFL-CIO, Unions to Increase Pressure on Eastern Air Lines, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 33, at A-7 (Feb. 19, 1988). The AFL-CIO requested the support of the
"traveling public and all trade unionists" in a "planned series of rallies, demon-
strations, and other activities ... at hub-city airports." Id. The AFL-CIO Council
also requested action by Congress, consumers, creditors and shareholders "to
,challenge the shortsightedness of Eastern's business strategy.' " Id. Finally, the
AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department established a commission to investigate
"Eastern's business practices and treatment of its employees." Id.
20 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. United Air Lines, 802 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1986),
354 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [55
ers. While such campaigns are generally considered to be
lawful, 2' they require careful planning and substantial re-
sources in order to be successful, and even then the "suc-
cess" of such a campaign is difficult to measure.2
Another avenue that unions increasingly pursue is the
flexing of their political muscle to bring governmental
pressure upon a targeted carrier. Labor's challenge
before the Department of Transportation of TWA's fit-
ness to operate, 23 - and its assault on Eastern before Con-
gress,24 the Federal Aviation Administration, and a
specially-formed "Citizens Commission of Inquiry into
Texas Air Corp."' 25 are recent examples. These efforts re-
quire the expenditure of substantial resources, however,
and while they may be annoying and even expensive to a
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987). Prior to its 1985 strike against United, ALPA
informed travel agents around the U.S. of the planned strike, suggesting that they
book their clients on other airlines. Id. at 893. ALPA also picketed a World Trade
Conference hosted by United's chairman, attempting to dissuade conference at-
tendees from flying United. Id.
21 See, e.g., id. at 906-07. While the Seventh Circuit expressed its disapproval of
ALPA's tactics "to undermine pubic confidence in United's ability to continue to
provide service" during the period preceding ALPA's strike against United, it did
not find ALPA's actions to have violated the Railway Labor Act, largely because
United could not show that it was harmed by them. Id.
2 For example, one target of labor's "corporate campaign" against Transamer-
ica Airlines was that carrier's corporate parent, Transamerica Corporation.
Transamerica Corporation ultimately decided to get out of the airline business,
however, shutting down the airline and reinvesting its resources elsewhere. See Air
Line Pilots Ass'n v. Transamerica Airlines, 123 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2682 (E.D.N.Y.
1986). As a result, all of the airline's employees became unemployed.
2. In re Application of Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants to Inst. a Continuing
Fitness Investigation into Carl Icahn's Management of Trans World Airlines,
DOT Order No. 89-1-35 (1988)(LEXIS, Trans. library, DOTAV file 44) (alleging
mismanagement of TWA and violation of 14 C.F.R. § 204.4 (1989), which re-
quires a carrier "proposing a substantial change in operations" to submit speci-
fied information to the DOT).
2 See, e.g., House PanelApproves Resolution Urging Deeper Federal Investigation of East-
ern, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 89, at A-10 (May 9, 1988) (describing congres-
sional resolution calling for Department of Transportation and FAA examination
of management practices at Eastern and Texas Air).
2. Commission Investigating Texas Air Hears Complaints from Subsidiaries' Employees,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 55, at A-12 (Mar. 22, 1988) (reporting on first hearing
of Citizen's Commission of Inquiry formed to investigate the impact of Texas
Air's acquisitions of Continental and Eastern Airlines).
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targeted carrier, their effectiveness as a means of gaining
bargaining leverage remains to be seen.
The chief remaining tools of economic pressure in-
creasingly used by airline unions are the work slowdown
and the employee "sickout." Implementation of these in-
sidious actions does not require the expenditure of sub-
stantial resources, and is generally very effective in
bringing pressure to bear on a carrier during bargaining.
Such actions often succeed in disrupting a carrier's opera-
tions by delaying or cancelling flights, and may result in
lost revenue, customer alienation and, if sufficiently
lengthy and pervasive, loss of market share. The genesis
of such actions is difficult to detect, and they often may be
masked in a professed concern for safety.
Work slowdowns and employee sickouts are unlawful.
A union's use of these tactics as tools of economic pres-
sure is prohibited by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) ,26 at
least to the extent they are conducted prior to exhaustion
of the RLA's mandatory dispute resolution procedures.
While injunctive relief is available to a carrier to prevent
premature self-help on the part of a union during bar-
gaining, union responsibility for such actions is often hard
to prove. Absent a "smoking gun," such as a circulated
memorandum or the public comments of a union official
calling for a slowdown or sickout, the union is likely to
deny responsibility for such an action should a carrier
seek injunctive relief. It is not uncommon for union offi-
cials to inform the court during hearings for restraining
orders or preliminary injunctions, albeit with not-too-sub-
tle winks and nods to their membership, that they abhor
violations of the RLA's commands and are doing every-
thing they can to put an end to the job action. Nonethe-
less, such a job action often will be well-organized and
building in strength as they speak. As unions have be-
come more sophisticated over the years, the likelihood
that they will leave many "smoking guns" for the carrier
26 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
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to seize upon as direct evidence to support an injunction
has decreased. Thus, the carrier faces a not insignificant
problem of proof.
Statistical analysis is a potent defensive weapon of
which carriers may avail themselves, however. The same
forms of analysis traditionally relied upon by courts to de-
termine whether unlawful discrimination has occurred
under the civil rights laws may be applied to airline em-
ployee slowdowns and sickouts. The methods of analysis
described in this article will determine the likelihood that
a particular job action-slowdown or sickout-occurred
purely as a matter of chance, or whether it can be inferred
that such an action occurred by virtue of some concerted
action or conspiracy. Statistical analysis can be used to
demonstrate that the odds against a particular increase in
aircraft maintenance writeups, flight cancellations or de-
lays, or employee absenteeism occurring purely at ran-
dom are overwhelmingly high. Such a showing provides a
powerful repudiation of union officials' self-serving deni-
als of responsibility for the instigation of such a job ac-
tion, and should establish at least a prima facie case of
union orchestration or conspiracy.
This article first discusses the phenomena of work slow-
downs and employee sickouts as they occur in the airline
industry. It then examines the law developed under the
RLA, which holds such actions to be unlawful. Finally,
this article explores the use of statistical analysis as a
means of overcoming the problem of proof that often
stands between a carrier and injunctive relief.
II. WORK SLOWDOWNS AND EMPLOYEE SICKOUTS IN THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Industrial guerilla warfare-in the form of work slow-
downs and employee sickouts-has staged a comeback in
recent times, particularly in the airline industry. Slow-
downs or interference by employees on the job are partic-
ularly in vogue. One observer recently noted that as
airline management becomes more aggressive in its re-
AIRLINE EMPLOYEE SLOWDOWNS
sponse to strikes, airline unions revive some old-style
forms of industrial warfare of their own. Examples of the
techniques utilized include Northwest baggage handlers
misrouting bags, and American flight attendants carrying
one tray at a time and reporting safety violations to the
FAA.2 7 According to one observer, "[b]ollixing the oper-
ation from within-the primal form of systematic pres-
sure-is the trend."' 28  Similarly, an AFL-CIO official
recently commented, "It's more effective to stay inside
and work to rule. Employers are much more frightened
of this, because they don't know what we're going to
do."
2 9
The "work to rule" strategy is most frequently em-
ployed in the airline industry by pilots, although mechan-
ics and other employee groups may engage in similar
types of slowdown actions as well. "Work to rule" is par-
ticularly well-suited to pilots because of the enormous
amount of discretion pilots have over safety issues and
other operational matters. Pilots have the prerogative to
insist that all aircraft systems be perfect before embarking
upon a flight, even though normally a pilot may overlook
minor defects or wait until the end of the day to have
them repaired. As part of a work slowdown, a pilot may
insist that non-airworthiness items such as loose toilet
handles, leaking galley faucets, scratched windows, and
loose tray tables be repaired prior to departure. Minoi
acts of sabotage may be engaged in as well, such as drain-
ing crew oxygen bottles or releasing emergency exit
slides. Each such item takes considerable time to repair
even under the best circumstances, but often these items
are "discovered" at remote stations where the carrier has
no line maintenance personnel of its own, requiring that
27 Conway, Standards Governing Permissible Self-Help, in CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF:
AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS SINCE DEREGULATION, supra note 1, at 201, 214.
28 Id. at 214.
21) Combination of Many Factors Seen Contributing to Decline In Strikes, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 62, at C-I (Apr. 3, 1989).
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maintenance personnel from another carrier be
summoned.
Pilots may also slow down flight operations by follow-
ing Federal Aviation Regulations and carrier operations
manuals to the letter. For example, pilots may insist upon
instrument approaches in clear weather or upon repeating
verbatim all air traffic controller instructions. On March
7, 1989, ALPA threatened to engage in such a "work to
rule" campaign on a nationwide basis in support of the
strike at Eastern. As it turned out, however, fewer flight
delays actually occurred nationwide on that day than
normal. °
Another tactic, utilized recently by United pilots and
called "Sweet Sixteen," involves purposely arriving more
than fifteen minutes late. This is accomplished by actions
such as slow taxiing, ordering elaborate maintenance
checks between flights, and flying with so much fuel that
the aircraft is slowed by its weight.3' This adversely af-
fects the carrier's published on-time performance rating,
as the Department of Transportation takes into account
only delays of more than fifteen minutes in compiling
such statistics.
Pilot slowdown campaigns date back to the 1960s, with
the advent of "Withdrawal of Enthusiasm" or "WOE"
campaigns directed against carriers engaged in bargaining
with ALPA. In August 1968, Max E. Davis, an Eastern
Airlines pilot, authored a paper entitled "The 'Slow
Down' As a Negotiating Tool. ' 33 This paper describes an
ALPA campaign for a "Withdrawal of the Spirit of Coop-
eration" during pilot negotiations at Eastern Airlines and
was designed to serve as a blueprint for future pilot
.10 Intelligence, 295 AVIATION DAILY 421, (Mar. 9, 1989). While there are nor-
mally an average of 1,148 flight delays per day, there were only 995 delays nation-
wide on March 7, 1989. Id.
.' Nomani, United Air's Performance Has Taken Big Dive, Hurt By Pilots' Union Action,
Wall. St.J., Sept. 18, 1989, at A4.
3 Id.
.- M. Davis, The "Slow Down" As a Negotiating Tool (Aug. 1968)(unpublished
paper).
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groups wishing to initiate a similar program.3 4
The author of this blueprint classified the slowdown as
an "economic weapon". He described how a "theme" is
developed for a slowdown campaign, based upon the goal
of encouraging pilots "not to let problems of low morale
[apparently the result of a lack of progress in collective
bargaining negotiations] influence them adversely in the
safe operation of their daily flights."36 The paper then
describes in detail the steps for an ALPA Master Execu-
tive Council to take in planning and executing a slowdown
campaign .3  This paper still circulates around the airline
industry today, and the number of pilot slowdowns that
have occurred in recent years indicates that its principles
are still being applied.
The net, and intended, result of slowdowns by pilots
and other employee groups is the delay or cancellation of
flights. Slowdowns bring a potent form of pressure to
bear upon a carrier because inconvenienced, irate passen-
gers caught in the middle of such a war between an airline
and its employees are likely to take their business else-
where, given the choice. A carrier's options in such a situ-
ation are limited. A carrier may discipline the ringleaders
if it can find them, but only if the conduct involved is not
simply strict adherence to the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions or company operating procedures. In addition, a
carrier may seek injunctive relief and damages, but such a
strategy can easily backfire if conclusive proof of a union
conspiracy is not available. A union in such a situation is
likely to defend itself in court and in the media by under-
scoring its "concern" for passenger safety, and no federal
judge is likely to order pilots to violate Federal Aviation
Regulations or to fly in an "unsafe" manner.
Employee sickouts are a less sophisticated version of
34 See id. at 1.
35 Id. at 8. "The slow down, call it what you will-'withdrawal of enthusi-
asm,"lay aside enthusiasm,' 'safety program,' 'withdrawal of the spirit of coopera-
tion'- is essentially an economic weapon against the Company." Id.
mi Id. at 2.
3 Id. at 2-8.
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guerilla warfare in the workplace than are slowdowns, but
they still occur. Sickouts are particularly prevalent among
flight attendants and ground personnel whose jobs do not
permit them as much discretion over carrier operations as
with pilots and mechanics. A sickout, if sufficiently wide-
spread, can cause the same magnitude of disruption to
service as can a slowdown, with flights being delayed or
cancelled for lack of crews. While a sickout is easier to
detect than a slowdown, proving union responsibility can
be just as difficult.3 8 Devices such as "telephone trees,"
communication networks by which the directive to call in
sick is spread by word of mouth, are often utilized, so that
no obvious "smoking guns" in the form of written direc-
tives may be found.
III. SLOWDOWNS AND SICKOUTS AS PREMATURE SELF-
HELP UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The Railway Labor Act (RLA), which governs air carri-
ers and their employees,3 9 provides a mandatory proce-
dure of negotiations, mediation and possible arbitration
whenever a carrier or union wishes to effect a change in
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 40  The
party desiring the change must first give the other party at
.18 See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. United Air Lines, 802 F.2d 886, 905-06 (7th
Cir. 1986) (requiring that a carrier prove union involvement by clear and convinc-
ing evidence), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987).
-- Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 487, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982)). The RLA was made applicable to the
airline industry in 1936. Id.
40 See 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982). Such disputes over the terms of an agreement are
now known as "major disputes." See Elgin, J. & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S.
711, 723 (1945). The Supreme Court describes major disputes as
disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to
secure them. They arise where there is no such agreement or where
it is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not
whether an existing agreement controls the controversy. They look
to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights
claimed to have vested in the past.
Id. at 723. "Minor disputes," on the other hand, relate either to the meaning or
proper application of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement already in
place. Id.
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least thirty days advance written notice of such change.4 1
The parties must then confer with one another concern-
ing the proposed change.42 If agreement cannot be
reached, either party may invoke the mediatory services of
the National Mediation Board (NMB).43 If the NMB's
services are invoked, that agency assigns a mediator to
meet with the parties in an attempt to induce agree-
ment.44 If the NMB determines that it will be unable to
bring about a settlement of the controversy through me-
diation, it will then proffer to the parties binding arbitra-
tion of the dispute.45 If either or both of the parties
declines the NMB's proffer of arbitration, the NMB noti-
fies the parties that its mediatory efforts have failed and
that they will be free to engage in self-help following the
expiration of a thirty-day "cooling off" period. 46 Addi-
tionally, the RIA provides that if a dispute, in the judg-
ment of the NMB, "threaten[s] substantially to interrupt
interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any
section of the country of essential transportation service,"
the NMB shall notify the President, who may create an
"Emergency Board" to investigate and report respecting
such dispute.47
Throughout this entire process, including the thirty-day
cooling off period ,48 "neither party may unilaterally alter
41 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
42 Id. § 152 Second.
4., Id. § 155a (First)(a).
4. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1203.1 (1988) (setting out the procedural require-
ments for application to the National Mediation Board).
45 45 U.S.C. § 155 (First) (1982).
46 Id.
47 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1982). Emergency Boards are relatively rare in the airline
industry. None has been appointed since the 1960s. While the NMB found con-
ditions to justify appointment of an Emergency Board in the Eastern Airlines
strike of 1989, the President disagreed and declined to appoint such a board. See
President Opts Not to Create Emergency Board, 295 AvIATION DAILY 391 (Mar. 6, 1989).
4" Where a Presidential Emergency Board has been appointed, the RLA pro-
vides for two thirty-day "cooling-off" periods. One cooling-off period follows the
NMB's proffer, and the parties refusal, of binding arbitration, 45 U.S.C. § 155
First (1982), and the other follows the Presidential Emergency Board's submis-
sion of its report to the President. 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
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the status quo."'4 9 The Supreme Court announced in De-
troit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad v. United Transportation
Union, that both parties are obligated during the cooling
off period to preserve and maintain the working condi-
tions in effect before the dispute arose.50 The Supreme
Court in Shore Line further noted that the immediate effect
of the RLA's status quo requirement is to prevent a strike,
while the long term effect is to provide time for tempers
to cool so that rational bargaining can occur.5 ' The
RLA's status quo obligation is enforceable via injunctive
relief,52 and a damages remedy for union violations of the
status quo may be available to carriers as well. 53
The status quo under the RLA extends to all those "ac-
tual, objective working conditions out of which the dis-
pute arose, and clearly [such] conditions need not be
covered in an existing [collective bargaining] agree-
ment."15 4 In the Congressional hearings on the legislation
that was to become the RLA, Donald Richberg, the chief
drafter of the legislation, commented about the status quo
obligations: "The thought was to include in the broadest
4,, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
378 (1969) (citing the Railway Labor Act, supra note 39, §§ 2 Seventh, 5 First, 6,
10).
- 396 U.S. 142, 152-53 (1969). The court held: "The obligation of both par-
ties during a period in which any of these status quo provisions is properly in-
voked is to preserve and maintain unchanged those actual, objective working
conditions, broadly conceived, which were in effect prior to the time the pending
dispute arose ..... Id.
Id. at 150. The court stated:
The Act's status quo requirement is central to its design. Its imme-
diate effect is to prevent the union from striking and management
from doing anything that would justify a strike. In the long run, de-
laying the time when the parties can resort to self-help provides time
for tempers to cool, helps create an atmosphere in which rational
bargaining can occur, and permits the forces of public opinion to be
mobilized in favor of a settlement without a strike or lockout.
Id.
Id5 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 581-84 (1971).
.- See Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 58
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2568, 2570 (D. Colo. 1965) (awarding carrier damages against
union for unlawful strike); see also Arouca, Damages for Unlawful Strikes Under the
Railway Labor Act, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1981) (discussing ways in which a court
can fashion a damages remedy for carriers injured by unlawful strikes).
14 Shore Line, 396 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
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way all the factors which contributed to what is commonly
called the status quo."55 For example, if a practice occurs
"for a sufficient period of time with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the employees to become in reality a part
of the actual working conditions," that practice becomes
part of the status quo,56 even if those practices differ from
those specified in a collective bargaining agreement.5 7
The RLA's status quo obligation prohibits work slow-
downs on the part of employees during the pendency of
collective bargaining negotiations. As RLA drafter
Richberg testified before Congress, the "kind of service
which the men are giving" is an integral part of the status
quo.58 Thus, union conduct which may not be classified
literally as a strike nonetheless constitutes a violation of
the status quo if it has the consequences of a strike.59
For example, in Texas International Airlines v. Air Line Pi-
lots Association, Texas International pilots engaged in a
number of tactics designed to slow down that carrier's op-
erations while contract negotiations were ongoing. 60
These tactics included submitting an excessive number of
equipment malfunction reports, reporting equipment
malfunctions at non-maintenance stations or in other
ways to delay operations, and calling in sick.6 1 ALPA de-
nied responsibility, arguing that the slowdown resulted
from "bad morale" on the part of pilots due to lack of
progress in contract negotiations.62
The court rejected ALPA's denial of responsibility, cit-
ing, among other things, a letter from ALPA's Master Ex-
5 Hearings on H.R. 7180 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1926) [hereinafter Hearings].
56 Shore Line, 396 U.S. at 154.
57 Air Cargo, Inc. v. Local Union 851, 733 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1984). "If the
parties have agreed to practices different than those specified in the collective
bargaining agreement ... the actual practices may constitute the status quo." Id.
58 Hearings, supra note 55, at 56 (emphasis added).
5- Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. United Air Lines, 802 F.2d 886, 906 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987).
"' 518 F. Supp. 203 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
Id. at 207.
112 Id. at 209.
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ecutive Council (MEC) chairman to all Texas
International pilots. 63 The letter urged pilots to "be pro-
fessional," to "adhere to company policies and contrac-
tual agreements," and "not [to] neglect even the most
minor writeups." 64 That letter further urged pilots "not
[to] start engines until all doors are closed, and
paperwork is on board, and checked for accuracy," and to
check every item on pre-flight and post-flight checklists. 65
The court noted that the MEC chairman's directive con-
cerning maintenance writeups was in fact followed by an
increase in the number of writeups. 66 Further, an instruc-
tion sent to pilots via the union's telephone committee
recommended that a pilot not fly if he did not feel well.
This generated a marked increase in the number of pilots
reporting off sick.67
The court found that the slowdown which resulted from
these activities constituted concerted action on the part of
the union members, 68 and a violation of the RLA. 69 Re-
jecting ALPA's professed concern for safety, the court
concluded that the increase in writeups was not "done for
safety reasons but to coerce the plaintiff to adopt the de-
fendant's contract proposals. ' 70 The court reasoned that
had the pilots truly been motivated by a concern for
safety, the number of maintenance writeups would have
steadily increased over time, as opposed to showing peaks




67 Id. at 211.
-, Id. at 213.
Id. at 217. The court observed:
Although ... mechancial items must be reported as they are identi-
fied by pilots, there necessarily exists a high degree of discretion
with the individual pilot as to such determinations, for example, as
whether a particular knob on the control panel is sticking or a partic-
ular lighted dial is dim to the point of needing a new light bulb. The
number of writeups, their timing and the location at which they are
submitted can have substantial impact on delays in flight operations.
id. at 210.
70 Id. at 213.
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and valleys.7
The Texas International court found the remaining re-
quirements for injunctive relief to be met as well.72  It
found that the loss of customer goodwill suffered by the
carrier as a result of the slowdown constituted irreparable
harm.73 Additionally, the court noted that injunctive relief
served the public's interest in unimpeded and timely
travel. 4
Other courts have enjoined work slowdowns as well,
although without extensive analysis. 75  One court ob-
served that concerted refusals of overtime, slowdowns,
sit-ins, and similar forms of harassment carried out by em-
ployees during contract negotiations violate the duty im-
posed by the RLA to make every reasonable effort to
settle disputes and to avoid interruption of service.76
Similarly, sickouts have also been held enjoinable.77 In
Pan American World Airways v. Independent Union of Flight At-
71 Id.
72 Id. at 214-15. The court applied the traditional four-part test for preliminary
injunctive relief:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) serious or
irreparable injury in the absence of preliminary [injunctive] relief;
(3) greater harm [to the moving party] in the absence of preliminary
[injunctive] relief than would be suffered by the opposing party if
such relief is granted, and (4) [injunctive relief is in] . . . the public
interest.
Id. at 215, (citing 7J. MooRE,J. LUCAS & K. SINcLAIR, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
65.04[l] (2d ed. 1989)).
7. Id. at 214.
74 Id. "The interest of the public is served by enjoining any and all actions that
would have the effect of impeding their right to travel and expectation of timely
travel." Id.
7.1 See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways v. Transport Workers Union, 117 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3350 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (slowdown and sickout enjoined); Piedmont Avia-
tion, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3216 (M.D.N.C. 1969) (work
slowdown enjoined); see also Long Island R.R. v. System Fed'n No. 156, 289 F.
Supp. 119 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (slowdown by railroad union enjoined).
76 United Air Lines v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 54 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2154, 2156 (N.D. Ill. 1963). The Railway Labor Act imposes the duty "to exert
every reasonable effort to settle all disputes in order to avoid any interruption to
commerce or to the operation of any carrier." Id.; 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1982).
77 See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. United Air Lines, 802 F.2d 886, 905 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987). "We have no doubt that a concerted union
plan to abuse sick leave as an economic weapon in the pre-strike period could be
found, in the appropriate circumstances, violative of the RLA." Id.
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tendants,78 flight attendants engaged in a sickout during
collective bargaining negotiations. Specifically, the sick-
out was called to protest the carrier's equipment switch,
which substituted aircraft requiring fewer flight attend-
ants.79 While there was no official union sponsorship of
the job action, the union emphatically announced to its
members that it had not agreed that there would not be a
sickout, maintaining that its officers could not be respon-
sible for the health of the flight attendants.80 In addition,
a letter circulated in Florida by "A Committee of Con-
cerned Flight Attendants" expressly called for a sickout, 8'
and a bulletin from the union's New York based chairper-
son implicitly encouraged the action.82
The court was not deterred by the absence of a "smok-
ing gun" directly tying the sickout to union officials. In
enjoining the job action, the court concluded that a seri-
ous question existed as to whether the union's actions,
and its inaction in not making a reasonable effort to dis-
courage the sickout, violated the union's duty under the
RLA to settle disputes without interrupting carrier
service.83
The court also noted the empirical evidence that both
the absolute number of flight attendants calling in sick
and the percentage of the total work force calling in sick
on the dates in question were significantly higher than the
year before. 84 The court found that the delays and under-
staffing of flights resulting from the sickout irreparably in-
jured the carrier's business reputation and goodwill
78 93 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 13,307 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
79 Id. at 20,039-20,040.
so Id. at 20,040. An unsigned notice on a union bulletin board read in part,
"IUFA officers [can] not be held responsible for the medical health of 6300 Flight
Attendants." Id.
" Id.
I0 d. at 20,939-20,040. Chairperson DeBisschop's message concluded:
"THE POWER TO EFFECT CHANGE FOR OUR GROUP COMES FROM
WITHIN. THE DECISION AS TO WHAT OUR FUTURE HOLDS RESTS
WITH EACH INDIVIDUAL MEMBER." Id.
, Id. at 20,041-20,042.
84 Id. at 20,036.
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among passengers. 85 The court further concluded that
the union and its members would not be injured by an
injunction, particularly since the union had steadfastly in-
sisted that it had not called or encouraged the sickout in
the first place.86
Slowdowns and sickouts, therefore, clearly are enjoin-
able under the RLA. One potential hurdle that unions at-
tempt to throw into the path of employers seeking
injunctive relief, however, is Section 106 of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act.8 7 This statute prohibits courts from holding
unions responsible for (among other things) illegal self-
help activity absent "clear proof" of the union's authori-
zation or ratification of such activity or of participation in
such activity by union officials.88
Courts will find union responsibility where a union offi-
cial, even at the local committeeman level, participated in
the unlawful activity.89 Even if a union official did not di-
rectly participate, courts will hold the union responsible if
the union does not use reasonable means to get the em-
ployees back to work.90 Moreover, a union's mere exhor-
tations to its membership to go back to work are not
necessarily sufficient to allow the union to escape liabil-
I d. at 20,036-20,037; accord Ozark Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 361 F.
Supp. 198, 202 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (loss of customer goodwill resulting from em-
ployee job action constitutes irreparable harm).
86 Pan Am., 93 Lab. Cas. (CCH) at 20,042.
87 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (1982 & Supp. II
1984).
88 Id. § 106. Section 106 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no as-
sociation or organization participating or interested in a labor dis-
pute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United
States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or
agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual
authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual
knowledge thereof.
Id.
8s) See, e.g., Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d
951, 963-64 (3d Cir. 1975); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Local 1104, 496 F.2d 954, 956
(8th Cir. 1974); Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 430 F.2d
446, 456 (5th Cir. 1970).
- See, e.g., Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 582 F.2d 1346,
1350 (4th Cir. 1978); Wagner Elec. Corp., 496 F.2d at 956.
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ity. 9' As one court recognized, a union's directives to its
members to return to work may be discounted if the di-
rectives lack authoritative forcefulness.92 Accordingly, a
union may not avoid liability for unlawful job actions
merely by denying responsibility and urging employees to
return to work. Measures such as union disciplinary ac-
tion against ringleaders and participants, or even tempo-
rary assumption of control over a local union by the
international leadership may be required.93
Another means by which courts may hold unions liable
for unlawful job actions is the "mass action" theory of lia-
bility. Under this theory, if all or a substantial majority of
the members of a bargaining unit engage in an unlawful
job action, union responsibility will be imputed.94 The
mass action theory, which has been described as a "sensi-
ble and pragmatic approach" to the problem of union re-
sponsibility for wildcat strikes,95 would be equally
applicable to slowdowns and sickouts. Like wildcat
strikes, slowdowns and sickouts do not just "happen"
without some central point of instigation or coordination.
E.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 598 F.2d 363, 365
(5th Cir. 1979) ("Ratification occurs where the union's efforts to return strikers
are so minimal that the union's approval or encouragement may be inferred.");
Wagner Elec. Corp., 496 F.2d at 956 (union's exculpatory press release not sufficient
to shield it from liability).
92 U.S. Steel Corp., 598 F.2d at 366. "The record supports the district court's
characterization of the local officials' return-to-work directives as so lacking in au-
thoritative forcefulness that they were not heard at all ... or were discounted as
being merely stage lines parroted for the benefit of some later judicial review."
Id.
' See, Eazor Express, 520 F.2d at 964.
' See, e.g., Carbon Fuel, 582 F.2d at 1349; Turnkey Constructors, Inc. v. Cement
Masons Local Union No. 685, 580 F.2d 798, 798-800 (5th Cir. 1978); Wagner Elec.
Corp., 496 F.2d at 956. The basis for this theory is that
[w]hen all members of a union employed by a given employer en-
gage in a concerted strike not formally authorized by the union, as
happened here, many courts hold the union responsible on the the-
ory that mass action by union members must realistically be re-
garded as union action. The premise is that large groups of men do
not act collectively without leadership and that a functioning union
must be held responsible for the mass action of its members.
Id.
Carbon Fuel, 582 F.2d at 1349-50.
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IV. THE USE OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS TO PROVE
CONSPIRATORIAL ACTION IN SLOWDOWNS AND
SICKOUTS
While prior cases usually have involved some overt in-
dicia of union instigation or responsibility, unions have
become increasingly adept at instigating slowdowns and
sickouts without leaving incriminating "smoking gun" evi-
dence behind. A carrier can become profoundly frus-
trated by the fact that, while the existence of a slowdown
or sickout during contract negotiations may be common
knowledge, the difficulty of proving conspiratorial action
on the part of the union and its leaders is often an insu-
perable bar to obtaining injunctive relief.
To overcome this difficulty, techniques of statistical
analysis long employed by the courts in civil rights and
employment discrimination cases96 may be adapted for
application to employee slowdowns and sickouts in the
airline industry. Just as statistical analysis can indicate
whether a particularly low number of minorities in a
workforce is of such statistical significance as to justify an
inference of discrimination in hiring or promotions, the
same statistical tools may be used to prove that a rise in
the number of flight delays or cancellations due to slow-
down activity, or an increase in the number of employees
calling in sick, is of such statistical significance as not to be
attributable to random causes.
A. The Binomial Method
While there are a number of available tests for statisti-
cal significance,9 7 one of the most popular and effective is
- For a discussion of the sophisticated statistical tools economists have devel-
oped to determine the existence and extent of unlawful employment discrimina-
tion, see generally Gwartney, Asher, Haworth & Haworth, Statistics, the Law and
Title VII: An Economist's View, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 633 (1979).
97 See, e.g., H. KOHLER, STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 190-234
(1988) (discussing binomial, hypergeometric and Poisson probability distribu-
tions); Keim & Quigg, The Sickout: Using and Evaluating Statistical Evidence in a Prima
Fade Case, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 445, 453-57 (1987) (applying Poisson formula to
employee sickouts).
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the binomial method. The binomial method is applied to
random stochastic events which can lead to only one of
two outcomes (hence the term "bi-nomial"). Examples
are selection of black vs. white employees, or males vs.
females. 98 More abstract notions, such as success vs. fail-
ure, may be analyzed by the binomial method as well.
A sequence of coin tosses provides a good illustration
of the binomial method. Each toss presents one of two
possible results: heads or tails. No matter how many
tosses are made, the probability of a random throw yield-
ing heads is exactly 0.5. Similarly, the probability of a ran-
dom throw yielding tails remains a constant 0.5 as well.
Taking another example, a selection of black employees
from a pool where 10% of the applicants are black would,
on the average, yield a selection probability of 0.1 black
and 0.9 white.99 That is, we would expect one black to be
chosen for every nine whites.
When the probability of a binomial random event is
known (based, for example, upon past experience), its ex-
pected value, E(v), may be calculated as follows:
E(v) = N X P(v),
where
N = the number of trials or the sample size of observa-
tions, and
P = the probability of the variable (v) to occur
randomly.
Thus, employing the simple coin-toss example, tossing a
coin 100 times (N = 100) would be expected to yield fifty
heads (100 X 0.5), and fifty tails (100 X (1 - 0.5)).
Since the event in question is assumed to be stochastic,
the outcome remains uncertain. In other words, the ac-
tual value observed may well differ from the expected
value. For example, in actuality, 100 coin tosses might
produce forty-five heads instead of fifty. Whether this dif-
:I D. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF 81 (1983).
1- Id.
[55
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ference is statistically significant must be determined
through further analysis.
The chief means of determining the statistical signifi-
cance of the difference between the expected value and
the actual value is by calculating the number of "standard
deviations" represented by the difference. The standard
deviation for a distribution is the number that describes
the degree to which disparities spread out above and be-
low the mean, or average, of the distribution.10 0 If it is
assumed that a sample distribution is a normal distribu-
tion, it can be represented as a bell-shaped curve bisected
by the mean of the distribution. (See Illustration # 1). In
any random distribution, the area under any segment of




that range of results occurring randomly. The statistical
significance of a given disparity of outcomes is reflected
on a relative scale ranging from 0 to 1.0.10' Since the
level of statistical significance rises as the probability level
declines from 1.0 to 0, a probability level of 0.01 is more
statistically significant than a probability level of 0.05.102
The percentage of the area underneath a bell curve
within one standard deviation from the mean of a normal
distribution is the same for all normal distributions,
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68.26%.103 This percentage represents the probability
that a particular result will occur within one standard
deviation of the mean. 0 4 The probability of a result oc-
curring within two standard deviations of the mean is
95.44%, and the probability of a result occurring within
three standard deviations is 99.73%. 105 (See Illustration
#2).





The standard deviation (a) for a particular distribution
is calculated as follows:
a = ,N XP(v) X( - P(v))
where N = number of trials of sample size of observations, and
P(v) = probability of the variable (v) to occur randomly.
The number of standard deviations for a particular distribu-
tion (z), in turn, is calculated as follows:
= A(v)-E(V)
a
where A(v) = actual value (or observed value), and
E(v) = expected value.
Once the number of standard deviations is calculated, the
., Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing W. CURTIS, STATIS-
TICAL CONCEPTS FOR ATrORNEYS 72-73 (1983)).
104 See id. at 93-94 (providing a basic explanation of the concept of standard
deviations).
-", Id. at 93.
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probability of a particular result occurring at random may be
determined by consulting standard statistical tables.' 0 6 In gen-
eral, however, the probability of an event occurring at random
is the inverse of the percentage of the area under the bell curve
represented by the number of standard deviations for a particu-
lar test statistic. For example, if the difference between the ex-
pected value and the actual value contains two standard
deviations, there is only a 4.56% percent chance that the differ-
ence is attributable to random factors. The probability of ran-
dom occurrence decreases exponentially as the value of z
increases. For example, where z = 3.7, the probability of the
event in question occurring by chance is approximately one in
10,000.
The role of statistical analysis then is to interpret the signifi-
cance of actual observations that vary from the expected value.
Are they random outlying events or the result of a biased, non-
random process? Statistics cannot establish as a matter of ab-
solute certainty whether or not a particular outcome occurred
at random. Statistics only deal with probabilities, and whether
a certain level of probability is statistically significant is a value
judgment. 0 7 To provide a general answer to this question
however, statisticians have devised the convention of the two to
three standard deviations rule.'0 8 Under this convention, if the
actual value (observed outcome) falls outside two or three stan-
dard deviations, then the presumption that such an outcome
occurred at random is typically rejected.'0 9
B. Judicial Application of the Binomial Method
Courts routinely have utilized the binomial method in
civil rights and employment discrimination cases. The
Supreme Court first relied upon this analysis in Castaneda
v. Partida,'10 a case involving racial discrimination in jury
selection. In Castaneda, the Court noted a disparity be-
tween the percentage of Mexican-American persons in the
county at issue (79.1%) and the percentage of Mexican-
,, One such table may be found in H. KOHLER, supra note 97, app. Table H, at
T-25.
107 D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 100, at 308.
,om Id. at 294-95.
1'- Id. at 294 n.12.
-0 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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Americans summoned for grand jury service (39%)."'
The court then applied the binomial method to determine
whether this disparity was statistically significant." 12
Given that 79.1% of the population in the county was
Mexican-American and 870 persons were selected to
serve on grand juries over the eleven-year period ex-
amined, the Castaneda Court reasoned that the expected
number of Mexican-Americans serving on grand juries
would be approximately 688.113 The actual number, how-
ever, was only 339.1 4 The Court recognized that in any
given drawing, the actual number of Mexican-Americans
selected may fluctuate from the number predicted statisti-
cally, but emphasized that the important point is whether
"the results of a random drawing are likely to fall in the
vicinity of the expected value." ' 1 5 The Court adopted the
two or three standard deviations test, and "noted that the
number of standard deviations between the expected
number of Mexican-American grand jurors and the actual
number selected was approximately twenty-nine." 6 The
Court further observed that, in light of the magnitude of
this difference, there was less than a one in ten to
the 140th power probability that such a substantial depar-
ture from the expected number occurred by chance." 17
Accordingly, the Court found a prima facie case of dis-
crimination in jury selection to have been established,
thus shifting the burden of proof to the defendant state to
overcome the presumption of intentional
discrimination. 118
The Supreme Court revisited the binomial method later
the same year in Hazelwood School District v. United States. "19
11, Id. at 495.






"~ Id. at 497-98.
433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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Hazelwood involved allegations of a pattern or practice of
employment discrimination in teacher hiring, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.120 The Court
noted that, while blacks comprised at least 5.7% of the
qualified teachers in the relevant geographical area, only
1.4% and 1.8% of the teachers in the Hazelwood School
District were black in the 1972-73 and 1973-74 school
years.12' The Court utilized the binomial method to de-
termine whether this disparity was statistically significant.
Using the 5.7% figure as the probability multiplier, and
multiplying it by the total number of teachers in the Ha-
zelwood District, the Court obtained "expected values" of
sixty-three black teachers in 1972-73 and seventy in 1973-
74.122 It then noted that the actual number of black teach-
ers employed each year was sixteen and twenty-two, re-
spectively.12 3 The binomial method indicated that the
difference between the actual value and the expected
value amounted to more than six standard deviations in
1972-73 and more than five in 1973-74.124 Because of this
finding, the burden of proof shifted to the employer to
dispel the presumption of discriminatory hiring sup-
ported by the binomial statistical method. 25
In Palmer v. Shultz, 12 6 the court synthesized the statistical
principles established by the Supreme Court in Castaneda
and Hazelwood, and applied the binomial method to a case
12o 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or to otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, condition, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
121 Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308.
122 Id. at 308 n.14.
123 Id.
i24 Id. Re-affirming the "two or three" standard deviations rule, the Court
maintained that, as a general rule when dealing with large samples, if the differ-
ence between the expected value and the actual value is greater than two or three
standard deviations, the validity of the hypothesis must be questioned. Id.
12. Id. at 310.
126 815 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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involving alleged sex discrimination in job assignments
and promotions at the State Department. 27 The Palmer
case is a useful reference, moreover, because the court
provides a detailed exposition of the binomial method
and its role in proving unlawful employment
discrimination.
The Palmer court begins its analysis by noting that a dis-
parity between the selection rates of men and women for
a particular job or job benefit has one of three possible
causes: (1) unlawful discriminatory animus, (2) a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory cause (e.g., only men might have
the prerequisite training or experience), or (3) pure
chance.28 The court explained that statistical analysis can
determine the probability that a particular disparity is the
result of chance. 29 If the probability of a disparity result-
ing from chance is sufficiently small, courts will inferfrom
the numbers alone that, more likely than not, the disparity
resulted from unlawful discrimination. 130 At that point, it
is up to the defendant to prove a non-discriminatory basis
for the disparity. 13' This may be done either by establish-
ing some legitimate cause for the disparity or by attacking
the statistical calculations. For example, the defendant
might discredit the calculations by showing that they are
based upon faulty data or flawed computations. 32
The Palmer court noted the imprecision inherent in the
''two or three" standard deviation test applied by the
Supreme Court in Castaneda and Hazelwood, and adopted a
.05 level of statistical significance. 13 3 This level represents
127 See id. at 89-90.
12" Id. at 90-91 (citing D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 100, at 291).
121' Id. at 91. "A statistical analysis of a disparity in selection rates can reveal the
probability that the disparity is merely a random deviation from perfectly equal se-
lection rates. Statistics, however, cannot entirely rule out the possibility that
chance caused the disparity." Id.
1-0 Id.
13, Id.
1-12 Id. at 99. However, more than "mere conjecture or assertion" is required
for the.defendant to show that some "missing factor," if taken into account by the
plaintiff, would explain the disparity. Id. at 101 (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478
U.S. 385 (1986)).
1 Id. at 92.
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1.65 standard deviations in a "one-tailed" test or 1.96
standard deviations in a "two-tailed" test. 13 4 At the .05
level, the odds are one in twenty that the result could have
occurred by chance. 3 5 Thus, in the Palmer court's view, a
probability of randomness of 5% or less is sufficient to
create a presumption of unlawful discrimination.
3 6
The binomial method has been applied by lower courts
in a number of other employment discrimination cases as
well.' 37 The frequency of its application is a compelling
indication of the confidence which the courts have placed
in it.
C. Applications of the Binomial Method to Airline Employee
Slowdowns and Sickouts
The binomial method may be applied to work slow-
downs and employee sickouts in the airline industry be-
cause most aspects of a slowdown or sickout are binomial
in nature: on-time operation vs. delayed operation, equip-
ment malfunction report vs. no report, flight cancellation
vs. no cancellation, reporting sick vs. reporting to work.
Application of the binomial method to these factors will
indicate whether an increase in flight delays, flight cancel-
lations, maintenance write-ups, or employees calling in
'-1 Id. at 94. A "one-tailed" test requires an observed disparity to occur at only
one end of the bell curve representing a normal distribution, while a "two-tailed"
test requires the disparity to occur at either end of the bell curve. Id. "Five per-
cent of the total bell curve can be found either in the range from 1.65 standard
deviations from the mean to one extreme end of the bell curve or in the area from
1.96 standard deviations to both extreme ends of the bell curve." Id. "Two-tailed
tests are used where the hypothesis to be rejected is that certain proportions are
equal [e.g., the number of observed occurrences in two different observation peri-
ods] and not that one proportion is equal to or greater than the other propor-
tion." Id. at 95. Thus, the two-tailed test will be most appropriate for analyzing
employee slowdowns and sickouts.
I5 ld. at 92.
1 6 Id.
117 See, e.g., McAlester v. United Air Lines, 851 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1988) (al-
lowing statistical evidence to be used in employment discrimination cases); EEOC
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (introduction of statistical
evidence requires the opposing party to produce its own evidence so as to raise a
material issue of fact); Coates v.Johnson &Johnson, 756 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1985)
(discussing the use of statistical data relating to employment discrimination).
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sick is attributable to chance (and thus innocent, at least
from the standpoint of concerted action) or to a conspir-
acy on the part of the union and its members.
A comparison of the raw numbers associated with ob-
served occurrences from one year to the next would gen-
erally be meaningless as evidence of a conspiracy.
Increases in observed occurrences under a simple com-
parison of raw numbers might be attributable to variables
such as schedule expansions, additions of new or older
aircraft, or increases in the number of flight crews or
other employees. Therefore, raw numbers are of little use
in proving an unlawful conspiracy.
The binomial method, by contrast, factors out these
variables by establishing appropriate benchmarks of neutral-
ity for comparison with the results observed during the
suspected job action at issue. An appropriate benchmark
for measuring pilot slowdown activity, for example, would
be the number of point-to-point flight segments flown.
This would permit an accurate comparison to be made
over two different time periods, regardless of whether the
number of aircraft, flights, or flight crews had increased
or decreased in the interim period. If, however, a new air-
craft type is introduced into service during the interim pe-
riod and that aircraft is proven to be particularly
susceptible to mechanical problems, flight segments for
that aircraft type may be eliminated from the comparison
to prevent a possible skewing of the distribution.
To construct a binomial model for analyzing a pilot
slowdown characterized by marked increases in delays,
cancellations, and equipment malfunction reports, it will
first be necessary to establish a period of time for compar-
ison. This period may be any length of time during which
slowdown activity has been occurring: a week, two weeks,
a month. Next, the number of flight segments flown, both
during the slowdown period and during the comparison
period, 13 8 must be determined. Finally, the number of
1.48 The comparison period ordinarily will be the same period during the previ-
ous year, although any prior period of identical duration may be used.
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observed incidents-delays, cancellations, equipment
malfunction reports-for both the current period and the
comparison period, must be measured.
Once all of this information is gathered, the analysis
may proceed. The first step is to determine the average
probability of the occurrence of a particular event, based
upon past experience. Thus,
P(i) = A(i)/F = Probability of (i) for total flight
segments during the comparison
period
where
F = number of flight segments flown in the
comparison period
A(i) = actual number of observations, where (i) is
defined MR, MRD, MRC, D or C, as follows:
MR = number of maintenance reports submitted
by pilots,
MRD = number of maintenance reports resulting in
flight delays,
MRC = number of maintenance reports resulting in
flight cancellations,
D = number of flight delays, and
C = number of flight cancellations.
This equation therefore defines the neutral benchmarks in
each of the categories needed for hypothesis testing.
P(i) is then multiplied by the total flight segments flown
in the current period to determine the expected value of
(i), or E(i)"
E(i) = P(i) X F'
where
F' = number of flight segments flown in current period.
E(i) is then compared with A'(i), the actual number of
occurrences of (i) in the current period. In order to deter-
mine whether the difference between the expected and ac-
tual values of (i) is statistically significant, it is necessary to
determine the number of standard deviations (z) repre-
sented by the difference between E(i) and A'(i). This is
calculated as follows:
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A'(i) - (P(i) X F')Z
or(i)
where
a (i) = V'P(i) X F' X (1 - P(i))
If the number of standard deviations is more than two or
three, it can be inferred that the increase in the number of
observed events is not due to random factors, but instead
is likely attributable to conspiratorial action on the part of
the pilots, by analogy to the principles established in Cas-
taneda and Hazelwood. This analysis can be applied to all
pilots during the suspect period, or to specific individual
pilots, in order to determine who is innocent and who is
guilty of conspiratorial action. Application of the analysis
to individual pilots would be particularly useful in deter-
mining the extent of union officials' involvement in the
job action.' 39
The binomial method may be applied to slowdowns by
employee groups other than pilots, or to sickouts by any
employee group. Examples of neutral benchmarks for
other groups are the number of trips flown for flight at-
tendants or shifts worked for ground employees. For a
suspected sickout, the occurrence measured (A(i) and
A'(i)) would be absenteeism, instead of cancelled or
delayed flights, but the mode of analysis set forth above
for pilot slowdowns would be the same.
If application of the binomial method to a slowdown or
sickout indicates a difference of more than two or three
standard deviations, the burden should be shifted to the
union to prove that the disparity is due to some factor
other than concerted action among the union's constitu-
ents. As in employment discrimination cases, the defend-
ant union could show that the carrier's statistical analysis
was faulty. However, by the same analogy, the union
could not defend merely by arguing that there was "no ev-
'1' See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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idence" of concerted activity or union instigation of the
job action.
Of course, in many cases in which a concerted slow-
down or sickout is actually occurring, the number of stan-
dard deviations between the actual and expected
measures under the binomial method may well exceed the
two or three standard deviation threshold that is normally
applied. While a union defendant in an action for injunc-
tive relief may protest that the Norris LaGuardia Act re-
quires that "clear and convincing" evidence of union
responsibility be shown, 40 it would be difficult for a court
to find such a standard is not met where it is shown that
the likelihood of an increase in flight delays, cancellations,
equipment malfunction reports, or employee absenteeism
being attributable to chance is less than a one in a million.
V. CONCLUSION
A carrier need not sit idly by in frustration while its em-
ployees engage in work slowdowns or sickouts during col-
lective bargaining negotiations. Such activity is illegal and
enjoinable. As unions have become more sophisticated in
conducting such actions, union responsibility has become
more difficult to prove. Statistical analysis provides carri-
ers with a tool to use in meeting this challenge of proof.
The binomial method in particular has served courts well
in civil rights and employment discrimination cases. This
method can serve equally well to aid carriers in challeng-
ing unlawful self help on the part of unions that otherwise
might cause disruptions of commerce, passenger incon-
venience, and irreparable economic injury to carriers.
140 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. United Air Lines, 802 F.2d 886, 905-06 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987).
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